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Abstract
Reinforcement learning agents are prone to unde-
sired behaviors due to reward mis-specification.
Finding a set of reward functions to properly
guide agent behaviors is particularly challeng-
ing in multi-agent scenarios. Inverse reinforce-
ment learning provides a framework to automati-
cally acquire suitable reward functions from ex-
pert demonstrations. Its extension to multi-agent
settings, however, is difficult due to the more
complex notions of rational behaviors. In this
paper, we propose MA-AIRL, a new framework
for multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning,
which is effective and scalable for Markov games
with high-dimensional state-action space and un-
known dynamics. We derive our algorithm based
on a new solution concept and maximum pseu-
dolikelihood estimation within an adversarial re-
ward learning framework. In the experiments, we
demonstrate that MA-AIRL can recover reward
functions that are highly correlated with ground
truth ones, and significantly outperforms prior
methods in terms of policy imitation.
1. Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general and powerful
framework for decision making under uncertainty. Recent
advances in deep learning have enabled a variety of RL ap-
plications such as games (Silver et al., 2016; Mnih et al.,
2015), robotics (Gu et al., 2017; Levine et al., 2016), auto-
mated machine learning (Zoph & Le, 2016) and generative
modeling (Yu et al., 2017). RL algorithms are also show-
ing promise in multi-agent systems, where multiple agents
interact with each other, such as multi-player games (Peng
et al., 2017), social interactions (Leibo et al., 2017) and
multi-robot control systems (Matignon et al., 2012). How-
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ever, the success of RL crucially depends on careful reward
design (Amodei et al., 2016). As reinforcement learning
agents are prone to undesired behaviors due to reward mis-
specification (Amodei & Clark, 2016), designing suitable
reward functions can be challenging in many real-world
applications (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017). In multi-agents
systems, since different agents may have completely dif-
ferent goals and state-action representations, hand-tuning
reward functions becomes increasingly more challenging as
we take more agents into consideration.
Imitation learning presents a direct approach to program-
ming agents with expert demonstrations, where agents
learn to produce behaviors similar to the demonstrations.
However, imitation learning algorithms, such as behavior
cloning (Pomerleau, 1991) and generative adversarial imita-
tion learning (Ho & Ermon, 2016; Ho et al., 2016), typically
sidestep the problem of interring an explicit representation
for the underlying reward functions. Because the reward
function is often considered as the most succinct, robust and
transferable representation of a task (Abbeel & Ng, 2004;
Fu et al., 2017), it is important to consider the problem of in-
ferring reward functions from expert demonstrations, which
we refer to as inverse reinforcement learning (IRL). IRL
can offer many advantages compared to direct policy imita-
tion, such as analyzing and debugging an imitation learning
algorithm, inferring agents’ intentions and re-optimizing
rewards in new environments (Ng et al., 2000).
However, IRL is ill-defined, as many policies can be op-
timal for a given reward and many reward functions can
explain a set of demonstrations. Maximum entropy inverse
reinforcement learning (MaxEnt IRL) (Ziebart et al., 2008)
provides a general probabilistic framework to solve the am-
biguity by finding the trajectory distribution with maximum
entropy that matches the reward expectation of the experts.
As MaxEnt IRL requires solving an integral over all possible
trajectories for computing the partition function, it is only
suitable for small scale problems with known dynamics.
Adversarial IRL (Finn et al., 2016a; Fu et al., 2017) scales
MaxEnt IRL to large and continuous problems by drawing
an analogy between a sampling based approximation of
MaxEnt IRL and Generative Adversarial Networks (Good-
fellow et al., 2014) with a particular discriminator structure.
However, the approach is restricted to single-agent settings.
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In this paper, we consider the IRL problem in multi-agent
environments with high-dimensional continuous state-action
space and unknown dynamics. Generalizing MaxEnt IRL
and Adversarial IRL to multi-agent systems is challenging.
Since each agent’s optimal policy depends on other agents’
policies, the notion of optimality, central to Markov decision
processes, has to be replaced by an appropriate equilibrium
solution concept. Nash equilibrium (Hu et al., 1998) is the
most popular solution concept for multi-agent RL, where
each agent’s policy is the best response to others. However,
Nash equilibrium is incompatible with MaxEnt RL in the
sense that it assumes the agents never take sub-optimal
actions. Thus imitation learning and inverse reinforcement
learning methods based on Nash equilibrium or correlated
equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) might lack the ability to handle
irrational (or computationally bounded) experts.
In this paper, inspired by logistic quantal response equilib-
rium (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995; 1998) and Gibbs sam-
pling (Hastings, 1970), we propose a new solution concept
termed logistic stochastic best response equilibrium (LS-
BRE), which allows us to characterize the trajectory distribu-
tion induced by parameterized reward functions and handle
the bounded rationality of expert demonstrations in a prin-
cipled manner. Specifically, by uncovering the close rela-
tionship between LSBRE and MaxEnt RL, and bridging the
optimization of joint likelihood and conditional likelihood
with maximum pseudolikelihood estimation, we propose
Multi-Agent Adversarial Inverse Reinforcemnt Learning
(MA-AIRL), a novel MaxEnt IRL framework for Markov
games. MA-AIRL is effective and scalable to large high-
dimensional Markov games with unknown dynamics, which
are not amenable to previous methods relying on tabular
representation and linear or quadratic programming (Natara-
jan et al., 2010; Waugh et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2014; 2018).
We experimentally demonstrate that MA-AIRL is able to
recover reward functions that are highly correlated to the
ground truth rewards, while simultaneously learning policies
that significantly outperform state-of-the-art multi-agent im-
itation learning algorithms (Song et al., 2018) in mixed
cooperative and competitive tasks (Lowe et al., 2017).
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Markov Games
Markov games (Littman, 1994) are generalizations of
Markov decision processes (MDPs) to the case ofN interact-
ing agents. A Markov game (S,A, P, η, r) is defined via a
set of states S , and N sets of actions {Ai}Ni=1. The function
P : S × A1 × · · · × AN → P(S) describes the (stochas-
tic) transition process between states, where P(S) denotes
the set of probability distributions over the set S. Given
that we are in state st at time t and the agents take actions
(a1, . . . , aN ), the state transitions to st+1 with probability
P (st+1|st, a1, . . . , aN ). Each agent i obtains a (bounded)
reward given by a function ri : S × A1 × · · · × AN → R.
The function η ∈ P(S) specifies the distribution of the
initial state. We use bold variables without subscript i to
denote the concatenation of all variables for all agents (e.g.,
pi denotes the joint policy, r denotes all rewards and a de-
notes actions of all agents in a multi-agent setting). We use
subscript −i to denote all agents except for i. For exam-
ple, (ai,a−i) represents (a1, . . . , aN ), the actions of all N
agents. The objective of each agent i is to maximize its
own expected return (i.e., the expected sum of discounted
rewards) Epi
[∑T
t=1 γ
tri,t
]
, where γ is the discount fac-
tor and ri,t is the reward received t steps into the future.
Each agent achieves its own objective by selecting actions
through a stochastic policy pii : S → P(Ai). Depend-
ing on the context, the policies can be Markovian (i.e., de-
pend only on the state) or require additional coordination
signals. For each agent i, we further define the expected
return for a state-action pair as: ExpRetpii,pi−ii (st,at) =
Est+1:T ,at+1:T
[∑
l≥t γ
l−tri(sl,al)|st,at,pi
]
2.2. Solution Concepts for Markov Games
A correlated equilibrium (CE) for a Markov game (Ziebart
et al., 2011) is a joint strategy profile, where no agent can
achieve higher expected reward through unilaterally chang-
ing its own policy. CE first introduced by (Aumann, 1974;
1987) is a more general solution concept than the well-
known Nash equilibrium (NE) (Hu et al., 1998), which
further requires agents’ actions in each state to be indepen-
dent, i.e. pi(a|s) = ΠNi=1pii(ai|s). It has been shown that
many decentralized, adaptive strategies will converge to CE
instead of a more restrictive equilibrium such as NE (Gor-
don et al., 2008; Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000). To take bounded
rationality into consideration, (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995;
1998) further propose logistic quantal response equilibrium
(LQRE) as a stochastic generalization to NE and CE.
Definition 1. A logistic quantal response equilibrium for
Markov game corresponds to any strategy profile satisfying
a set of constraints, where for each state and action, the
constraint is given by:
pii(ai|s) = exp (λExpRet
pi
i (s, ai,a−i))∑
a′i
exp (λExpRetpii (s, a
′
i,a−i))
Intuitively, in LQRE, agents choose actions with higher
expected return with higher probability.
2.3. Learning from Expert Demonstrations
Suppose we do not have access to the ground truth reward
signal r, but have demonstrations D provided by an expert
(N expert agents in Markov games). D is a set of trajectories
{τj}Mj=1, where τj = {(stj ,atj)}Tt=1 is an expert trajectory
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collected by sampling s1 ∼ η(s),at ∼ piE(at|st), st+1 ∼
P (st+1|st,at). D contains the entire supervision to the
learning algorithm, i.e., we assume we cannot ask for addi-
tional interactions with the experts during training. Given
D, imitation learning (IL) aims to directly learn policies
that behave similarly to these demonstrations, whereas in-
verse reinforcement learning (IRL) (Russell, 1998; Ng et al.,
2000) seeks to infer the underlying reward functions which
induce the expert policies.
The MaxEnt IRL framework (Ziebart et al., 2008) aims
to recover a reward function that rationalizes the expert
behaviors with the least commitment, denoted as IRL(piE):
IRL(piE) = arg max
r∈RS×A
EpiE [r(s, a)]− RL(r)
RL(r) = max
pi∈Π
H(pi) + Epi[r(s, a)]
where H(pi) = Epi[− log pi(a|s)] is the policy entropy.
However, MaxEnt IRL is generally considered less effi-
cient and scalable than direct imitation, as we need to solve
a forward RL problem in the inner loop. In the context of
imitation learning, (Ho & Ermon, 2016) proposed to use
generative adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014), to
learn the policies characterized by RL ◦ IRL(piE) directly,
leading to the Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning
(GAIL) algorithm:
min
θ
max
ω
EpiE [logDω(s, a)] + Epiθ [log(1−Dω(s, a))]
where Dω is a discriminator that classifies expert and policy
trajectories, and piθ is the parameterized policy that tries to
maximize its score under Dω. According to Goodfellow
et al. (2014), with infinite data and infinite computation, at
optimality, the distribution of generated state-action pairs
should exactly match the distribution of demonstrated state-
action pairs under the GAIL objective. The downside to
this approach, however, is that we bypass the intermediate
step of recovering rewards. Specifically, note that we cannot
extract reward functions from the discriminator, as Dω(s, a)
will converge to 0.5 for all (s, a) pairs.
2.4. Adversarial Inverse Reinforcement Learning
Besides resolving the ambiguity that many optimal rewards
can explain a set of demonstrations, another advantage of
MaxEnt IRL is that it can be interpreted as solving the
following maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) problem:
pω(τ) ∝
[
η(s1)
T∏
t=1
P (st+1|st, at)
]
exp
(
T∑
t=1
rω(s
t, at)
)
(1)
max
ω
EpiE [log pω(τ)] = Eτ∼piE
[
T∑
t=1
rω(s
t, at)
]
− logZω
Here, ω are the parameters of the reward function and Zω
is the partition function, i.e. an integral over all possible
trajectories consistent with the environment dynamics. Zω is
intractable to compute when the state-action spaces are large
or continuous, and the environment dynamics are unknown.
Combining Guided Cost Learning (GCL) (Finn et al.,
2016b) and generative adversarial training, Finn et al.; Fu
et al. proposed adversarial IRL framework as an efficient
sampling based approximation to the MaxEnt IRL, where
the discriminator takes on a particular form:
Dω(s, a) =
exp(fω(s, a))
exp(fω(s, a)) + q(a|s)
where fω(s, a) is the learned function, q(a|s) is the prob-
ability of the adaptive sampler pre-computed as an input
to the discriminator, and the policy is trained to maximize
logD − log(1−D).
To alleviate the reward shaping ambiguity (Ng et al., 1999),
where many reward functions can explain an optimal policy,
(Fu et al., 2017) further restricted f to a reward estimator
gω and a potential shaping function hφ:
fω,φ(s, a, s
′) = gω(s, a) + γhφ(s′)− hφ(s)
It has been shown that under suitable assumptions, gω and
hφ will recover the true reward and value function up to a
constant.
3. Method
3.1. Logistic Stochastic Best Response Equilibirum
To extend MaxEnt IRL to Markov games, we need be able
to characterize the trajectory distribution induced by a set of
(parameterized) reward functions {ri(s,a)}Ni=1 (analogous
to Equation (1)). However existing optimality notions intro-
duced in Section 2.2 do not explicitly define a tractable joint
strategy profile that we can use to maximize the likelihood
of expert demonstrations (as a function of the rewards); they
do so implicitly as the solution to a set of constraints.
Motivated by Gibbs sampling (Hastings, 1970), dependency
networks (Heckerman et al., 2000), best response dynamic
(Nisan et al., 2011; Gandhi, 2012) and LQRE, we propose
a new solution concept that allows us to characterize ratio-
nal (joint) policies induced from a set of reward functions.
Intuitively, our solution concept corresponds to the result
of repeatedly applying a stochastic (entropy-regularized)
best response mechanism, where each agent (in turns) at-
tempts to optimize its actions while keeping the other agents’
actions fixed.
To begin with, let us first consider a stateless single-shot
normal-form game with N players and a reward function
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ri : A1 × . . . × AN → R for each player i. We con-
sider the following Markov chain over (A1 × · · · × AN ),
where the state of the Markov chain at step k is denoted
z(k) = (z1, · · · , zN )(k), with each random variable z(k)i
taking values in Ai. The transition kernel of the Markov
Chain is defined by the following equations:
z
(k+1)
i ∼ Pi(ai|a−i = z(k)−i ) =
exp(λri(ai, z
(k)
−i ))∑
a′i
exp(λri(a′i, z
(k)
−i ))
(2)
and each agent i is updated in scan order. Given all other
players’ actions z(k)−i , the i-th player picks an action propor-
tionally to exp(λri(ai, z
(k)
−i )), where λ > 0 is a parameter
that controls the level of rationality of the agents. For λ→ 0,
the agent will select actions uniformly at random, while for
λ → ∞, the agent will select actions greedily (best re-
sponse). Because the Markov Chain is ergodic, it admits a
unique stationary distribution which we denote pi(a). Inter-
preting this stationary distribution over (A1×· · ·×AN ) as a
policy, we call this stationary joint policy a logistic stochas-
tic best response equilibrium for normal-form games.
Now let us generalize the solution concept to Markov games.
For each agent i, let {piti}Tt=1 denote a set of time-dependent
policies. First we define the state action value function for
each agent i. Starting from the base case:
Qpi
∅
i (s
T , aTi ,a
T
−i) = ri(s
T , aTi ,a
T
−i)
then we recursively define:
Qpi
t+1:T
i (s
t, ati,a
t
−i) = ri(s
t, ati,a
t
−i)+
Est+1∼P (·|st,at)
[
H(pit+1i (·|st+1))+
Eat+1∼pit+1(·|st+1)[Q
pit+2:T
i (s
t+1,at+1)]
]
which generalizes the standard state-action value function
in single-agent RL (a−i = ∅ when N = 1).
Definition 2. Given a Markov game with horizon T , the
logistic stochastic best response equilibrium (LSBRE) is
a sequence of T stochastic policies {pit}Tt=1 constructed
by the following process. Consider T Markov chains over
(A1×· · ·AN )|S|, where the state of the t-th Markov chain at
step k is {zt,(k)i : S → Ai}Ni=1, with each random variable
z
t,(k)
i (s) taking values in Ai. For t ∈ [T, . . . , 1], we recur-
sively define the the stationary joint distribution pit(a|s) of
the t-th Markov chain in terms of {pi`}T`=t+1 as:
For st ∈ S, i ∼ [1, · · · , N ], we update the state of the
Markov chain as:
z
t,(k+1)
i (s
t) ∼ P ti (ati|at−i = zt,(k)−i (st), st) =
exp
(
λQpi
t+1:T
i (s
t, ati, z
t,(k)
−i (s
t))
)
∑
a′i
exp
(
λQpi
t+1:T
i (s
t, a′i, z
t,(k)
−i (st)
) (3)
where parameter λ ∈ R+ controls the level of rationality
of the agents, and {P ti }Ni=1 specifies a set of conditional
distributions. LSBRE for Markov game is the sequence
of T joint stochastic policies {pit}Tt=1. Each joint policy
pit : S → P(A1 × · · · × AN ) is given by:
pit(a1, · · · , aN |st) = P
(⋂
i
{zt,(∞)i (st) = ai}
)
(4)
where the probability is taken with respect to the unique
stationary distribution of the t-th Markov chain.
When the set of conditionals in Equation (2) are compatible
(in the sense that each conditional can be inferred from the
same joint distribution (Arnold & Press, 1989)), the above
process corresponds to a Gibbs sampler, which will con-
verge to a stationary joint distribution pi(a), whose condi-
tional distributions are consistent with the ones used during
sampling, namely Equation (2). This is the case, for exam-
ple, if the agents are cooperative, i.e., they share the same
reward function ri. In general, pi(a) is the distribution spec-
ified by the dependency network (Heckerman et al., 2000)
defined via conditionals in Equation (2). The same argu-
ment can be made for the Markov Chains in Definition 2
with respect to the conditionals in Equation (3).
When the set of conditionals in Equation (2) and (3) are in-
compatible, the procedure is called a pseudo Gibbs sampler.
As discussed in literatures on dependency networks (Hecker-
man et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2011; Chen & Ip, 2015), when
the conditionals are learned from a sufficiently large dataset,
the pseudo Gibbs sampler asymptotically works well in the
sense that the conditionals of the stationary joint distribu-
tion are nearly consistent with the conditionals used during
sampling. Under some conditions, theoretical bounds on the
approximation can be obtained (Heckerman et al., 2000).
3.2. Trajectory Distributions Induced by LSBRE
Following (Fu et al., 2017; Levine, 2018), without loss of
generality, in the remainder of this paper we consider the
case where λ = 1. First, we note that there is a connec-
tion between the notion of LSBRE and maximum causal
entropy reinforcement learning (Ziebart, 2010). Specifically,
we can characterize the trajectory distribution induced by
LSBRE policies with an energy-based formulation, where
the probability of a trajectory increases exponentially as
the sum of rewards increases. Formally, with LSBRE poli-
cies, the probability of generating a certain trajectory can be
characterized with the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Given a joint policy {pit(at|st)}Tt=1 specified
by LSBRE, for each agent i, let {pit−i(at−i|st)}Tt=1
denote other agents’ marginal distribution and
{piti(ati|at−i, st)}Tt=1 denote agent i’s conditional dis-
tribution, both obtained from the LSBRE joint policies.
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Then the LSBRE conditional distributions are the optimal
solution to the following optimization problem:
min
pˆi1:T
DKL(pˆ(τ)||p˜(τ)) (5)
pˆ(τ) =
[
η(s1) ·
T∏
t=1
P (st+1|st,at) · pit−i(at−i|st))
]
·
T∏
t=1
pˆiti(a
t
i|at−i, st)
p˜(τ) ∝
[
η(s1) ·
T∏
t=1
P (st+1|st,at) · pit−i(at−i|st))
]
·
exp
(
T∑
t=1
ri(s
t, ati,a
t
−i)
)
(6)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Intuitively, for single-shot normal form games, the above
statement holds obviously from the definition in Equation
(2). For Markov games, similar to the process introduced
in Definition 2, we can employ a dynamic programming
algorithm to find the conditional policies which minimizes
Equation (5). Specifically, we first construct the base case of
t = T as a normal form game, then recursively construct the
conditional policy for each time step t, based on the policies
from t+1 to T that have already been constructed. It can be
shown that the constructed optimal policy which minimizes
the KL divergence between its trajectory distribution and the
trajectory distribution defined in Equation (6) corresponds
to the set of conditional policies in LSBRE.
3.3. Multi-Agent Adversarial IRL
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that the expert
policies form a unique LSBRE under some unknown (pa-
rameterized) reward functions, according to Definition 2.
By adopting LSBRE as the optimality notion, we are able
to rationalize the demonstrations by maximizing the likeli-
hood of the expert trajectories with respect to the LSBRE
stationary distribution, which is in turn induced by the ω-
parameterized reward functions {ri(s,a;ωi)}Ni=1.
The probability of a trajectory τ = {st,at}Tt=1 generated
by LSBRE policies in a Markov game is defined by the
following generative process:
p(τ) = η(s1) ·
T∏
t=1
pit(at|st;ω) ·
T∏
t=1
P (st+1|st,at) (7)
where pit(at|st;ω) are the unique stationary joint dis-
tributions for the LSBRE induced by {ri(s,a;ωi)}Ni=1.
The initial state distribution η(s1) and transition dynam-
ics P (st+1|st,at) are specified by the Markov game.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the MaxEnt IRL framework
interprets finding suitable reward functions as maximum
likelihood over the expert trajectories in the distribution
defined in Equation (7), which can be reduced to:
max
ω
Eτ∼piE
[
T∑
t=1
logpit(at|st;ω)
]
(8)
since the initial state distribution and transition dynamics
do not depend on the parameterized rewards.
Note that pit(at|st) in Equation (8) is the joint policy de-
fined in Equation (4), whose conditional distributions are
given by Equation (3). From Section 3.1, we know that
given a set ofω-parameterized reward functions, we are able
to characterize the conditional policies {piti(ati|at−i, st)}Tt=1
for each agent i. However direct optimization over the joint
MLE objective in Equation (8) is intractable, as we cannot
obtain a closed form for the stationary joint policy. Fortu-
nately, we are able to construct an asymptotically consistent
estimator by approximating the joint likelihood pit(at|st)
with a product of the conditionals
∏
i=1 pi
t
i(a
t
i|at−i, st),
which is termed a pseudolikelihood (Besag, 1975).
With the asymptotic consistency property of the maximum
pseudolikelihood estimation (Besag, 1975; Lehmann &
Casella, 2006), we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let demonstrations τ1, . . . , τM be independent
and identically distributed (sampled from LSBRE induced by
some unknown reward functions), and suppose that for all
t ∈ [1, . . . , T ], ati ∈ Ai, piti(ati|at−i, st;ωi) is differentiable
with respect to ωi. Then, with probability tending to 1 as
M →∞, the equation
∂
∂ω
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
log piti(a
m,t
i |am,t−i , sm,t;ωi) = 0 (9)
has a root ωˆM such that ωˆM tends to the maximizer of the
joint likelihood in Equation (8).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Theorem 2 bridges the gap between optimizing the joint
likelihood and each conditional likelihood. Now we are able
to maximize the objective in Equation (8) as:
EpiE
[
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∂
∂ω
log piti(a
t
i|at−i, st;ωi)
]
(10)
To optimize the maximum pseudolikelihood objective in
Equation (10), we can instead optimize the following surro-
gate loss which is a variational approximation to the psuedo-
likelihood objective (from Theorem 1):
EpiE
[
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
∂
∂ω
ri(s
t,at;ωi)
]
−
N∑
i=1
∂
∂ω
logZωi
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where Zωi is the partition function of the distribution in
Equation (6). It is generally intractable to exactly compute
and optimize the partition function Zω, which involves an
integral over all trajectories. Similar to GCL (Finn et al.,
2016b) and single-agent AIRL (Fu et al., 2017), we employ
importance sampling to estimate the partition function with
adaptive samplers qθ. Now we are ready to introduce our
practical Multi-Agent Adversarial IRL (MA-AIRL) frame-
work, where we train the ω-parameterized discriminators
as:
max
ω
EpiE
[
N∑
i=1
log
exp(fωi(s,a))
exp(fωi(s,a)) + qθi(ai|s)
]
+
Eqθ
[
N∑
i=1
log
qθi(ai|s)
exp(fωi(s,a)) + qθi(ai|s)
]
(11)
and we train the θ-parameterized generators as:
max
θ
Eqθ
[
N∑
i=1
log(Dωi(s,a))− log(1−Dωi(s,a))
]
= Eqθ
[
N∑
i=1
fωi(s,a)− log(qθi(ai|s))
]
(12)
Specifically, for each agent i, we have a discriminator with
a particular structure exp(fω)exp(fω)+qθ for a binary classification,
and a generator as an adaptive importance sampler for es-
timating the partition function. Intuitively, qθ is trained to
minimize the KL divergence between its trajectory distribu-
tion and that induced by the reward functions, for reducing
the variance of importance sampling, while fω in the dis-
criminator is trained to estimate the reward function. At
optimality, fω will approximate the advantage function for
the expert policy and qθ will approximate the expert policy.
3.4. Solving Reward Ambiguity in Multi-Agent IRL
For single-agent reinforcement learning, Ng et al. shows that
for any state-only potential function φ : S → R, potential-
based reward shaping defined as:
r′(st, at, st+1) = r(st, at, st+1) + γΦ(st+1)− Φ(st)
is a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee invari-
ance of the optimal policy in both finite and infinite horizon
MDPs. In other words, given a set of expert demonstrations,
there is a class of reward functions, all of which can explain
the demonstrated expert behaviors. Thus without further
assumptions, it would be impossible to identify the ground-
truth reward that induces the expert policy within this class.
Similar issues also exist when we consider multi-agent sce-
narios. Devlin & Kudenko show that in multi-agent systems,
using the same reward shaping for one or more agents will
not alter the set of Nash equilibria. It is possible to extend
Algorithm 1 Multi-Agent Adversarial IRL
Input: Expert trajectories DE = {τEj }; Markov game as
a black box with parameters (N,S,A, η,P , γ)
Initialize the parameters of policies q, reward estimators
g and potential functions h with θ,ω,φ.
repeat
Sample trajectories Dpi = {τj} from pi:
s1 ∼ η(s),at ∼ pi(at|st), st+1 ∼ P (st+1|st,at)
Sample state-action pairs Xpi , XE from Dpi , DE .
for i = 1, . . . , N do
Update ωi, φi to increase the objective in Eq. 11:
EXE [logD(s, ai, s
′)] + EXpi [log(1−D(s, ai, s′))]
end for
for i = 1, . . . , N do
Update reward estimates rˆi(s, ai, s′) with gωi(s, ai).
or (logD(s, ai, s′)− log(1−D(s, ai, s′)))
Update θi with respect to rˆi(s, ai, s′).
end for
until Convergence
Output: Learned policies piθ and reward functions gω .
this result to other solution concepts such as CE and LS-
BRE. For example, in the case of LSBRE, after specifying
the level of rationality λ, for any pii 6= piLSBREi , we have:
EpiLSBREi ,piLSBRE−i [ri(s,a)] ≥ Epii,piLSBRE−i [ri(s,a)] (13)
since each individual LSBRE conditional policy is the opti-
mal solution to the corresponding entropy regularized RL
problem (See Appendix (A.1)). It can be also shown that
any policy that satisfies the inequality in Equation (13) will
still satisfy the inequality after reward shaping (Devlin &
Kudenko, 2011).
To mitigate the reward shaping effect and recover reward
functions with higher linear correlation to the ground truth
reward, as in (Fu et al., 2017), we further assume the func-
tions fωi in Equation (11) have a specific structure:
fωi,φi(s
t, at, st+1) = gωi(s
t, at) + γhφi(s
t+1)− hφi(st)
where gω is a reward estimator and hφ is a potential func-
tion. We summarize the MA-AIRL training procedure in
Algorithm 1.
4. Related Work
A vast number of methods and paradigms have been pro-
posed for single-agent imitation learning and inverse rein-
forcement learning. However, multi-agent scenarios are less
commonly investigated, and most existing works assume
specific reward structures. These include fully cooperative
games (Barrett et al., 2017; Le et al., 2017; Sˇosˇic´ et al., 2017;
Bogert & Doshi, 2014), two player zero-sum games (Lin
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et al., 2014), and rewards as linear combinations of pre-
specified features (Reddy et al., 2012; Waugh et al., 2013).
Recently, Song et al. proposed MA-GAIL, a multi-agent
extension of GAIL which works on general Markov games.
While both MA-AIRL and MA-GAIL are based on adversar-
ial training, the methods are inherently different. MA-GAIL
is based on the notion of Nash equilibrium, and is motivated
via a specific choice of Lagrange multipliers for a constraint
optimization problem. MA-AIRL, on the other hand, is
derived from MaxEnt RL and LSBRE, and aims to obtain
an MLE solution for the joint trajectories; we connect this
with a set of conditionals via pseudolikelihood, which are
then solved with the adversarial reward learning framework.
From a reward learning perspective, the discriminators’ out-
puts in MA-GAIL will converge to uninformative uniform
distribution, while MA-AIRL allows us to recover reward
functions from the optimal discriminators.
5. Experiments
We seek to answer the following questions via empirical
evaluation: (1) Can MA-AIRL efficiently recover the expert
policies for each individual agent from the expert demon-
strations (policy imitation)? (2) Can MA-AIRL effectively
recover the underlying reward functions, for which the ex-
pert policies form a LSBRE (reward recovery)?
Task Description To answer these questions, we evaluate
our MA-AIRL algorithm on a series of simulated particle en-
vironments (Lowe et al., 2017). Specifically, we consider the
following scenarios: cooperative navigation, where three
agents cooperate through physical actions to reach three
landmarks; cooperative communication, where two agents,
a speaker and a listener, cooperate to navigate to a particu-
lar landmark; and competitive keep-away, where one agent
tries to reach a target landmark, while an adversary, without
knowing the target a priori, tries to infer the target from
the agent’s behaviors and prevent it from reaching the goal
through physical interactions.
In our experiments, for generality, the learning algorithms
will not leverage any prior knowledge on the types of in-
teractions (cooperative or competitive). Thus for all the
tasks described above, the learning algorithms will take a
decentralized form and we will not utilize additional re-
ward regularization, besides penalizing the `2 norm of the
reward parameters to mitigate overfitting (Ziebart, 2010;
Kalakrishnan et al., 2013).
Training Procedure In the simulated environments, we
have access to the ground-truth reward functions, which en-
ables us to accurately evaluate the quality of both recovered
policies and reward functions. We use a multi-agent version
of ACKTR (Wu et al., 2017; Song et al., 2018), an efficient
model-free policy gradient algorithm for training the experts
as well as the adaptive samplers in MA-AIRL. The super-
vision signals for the experts come from the ground-truth
rewards, while the reward signals for the adaptive samplers
come from the discriminators. Specifically, we first obtain
expert policies induced by the ground-truth rewards, then
we use them to generate demonstrations, from which the
learning algorithms will try to recover the policies as well
as the underlying reward functions. We compare MA-AIRL
against the state-of-the-art multi-agent imitation learning
algorithm, MA-GAIL (Song et al., 2018), which is a gener-
alization of GAIL to Markov games. Following (Li et al.,
2017; Song et al., 2018), we use behavior cloning to pretrain
MA-AIRL and MA-GAIL to reduce sample complexity for
exploration, and we use 200 episodes of expert demonstra-
tions, each with 50 time steps, which is close to the amount
of time steps used in (Ho & Ermon, 2016)1.
5.1. Policy Imitation
Although MA-GAIL achieved superior performance com-
pared with behavior cloning (Song et al., 2018), it only aims
to recover policies via distribution matching. Moreover, the
training signal for the policy will become less informative as
training progresses; according to (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
with infinite data and computational resources the discrimi-
nator outputs will converge to 0.5 for all state-action pairs,
which could potentially hinder the robustness of the pol-
icy towards the end of training. To empirically verify our
claims, we compare the quality of the learned policies in
terms of the expected return received by each agent.
In the cooperative environment, we directly use the ground-
truth rewards from the environment as the oracle metric,
since all agents share the same reward. In the competitive
environment, we follow the evaluation procedure in (Song
et al., 2018), where we place the experts and learned policies
in the same environment. A learned policy is considered
“better” if it receives a higher expected return while its op-
ponent receives a lower expected return. The results for
cooperative and competitive environments are shown in Ta-
bles 1 and 2 respectively. MA-AIRL consistently performs
better than MA-GAIL in terms of the received reward in all
the considered environments, suggesting superior imitation
learning capabilities to the experts.
5.2. Reward Recovery
The second question we seek to answer is concerned with
the reward recovering problem as in inverse reinforcement
learning: is the algorithm able to recover the ground truth
reward functions with expert demonstrations being the only
source of supervision? To answer this question, we evaluate
the statistical correlations between the ground truth rewards
1The codebase for this work can be found at https://
github.com/ermongroup/MA-AIRL.
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Table 1. Expected returns in cooperative tasks. Mean and variance
are taken across different random seeds used to train the policies.
Algorithm Nav. ExpRet Comm. ExpRet
Expert -43.195 ± 2.659 -12.712 ± 1.613
Random -391.314 ± 10.092 -125.825 ± 3.4906
MA-GAIL -52.810 ± 2.981 -12.811 ± 1.604
MA-AIRL -47.515 ± 2.549 -12.727 ± 1.557
Table 2. Expected returns of the agents in competitive task.
Agent #1 represents the agent trying to reach the target and
Agent #2 represents the adversary. Mean and variance are taken
across different random seeds.
Agent #1 Agent #2 Agent #1 ExpRet
Expert Expert -6.804 ± 0.316
MA-GAIL Expert -6.978 ± 0.305
MA-AIRL Expert -6.785 ± 0.312
Expert MA-GAIL -6.919 ± 0.298
Expert MA-AIRL -7.367± 0.311
(which the learning algorithms have no access to) and the
inferred rewards for the same state-action pairs.
Specifically, we consider two types of statistical correlations:
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC), which measures
the linear correlation between two random variables; and
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (SCC), which mea-
sures the statistical dependence between the rankings of two
random variables. Higher SCC suggests that two reward
functions have higher monotonic relationships and higher
PCC suggests higher linear correlations. For each trajectory,
we compare the ground-truth return from the environment
with the supervision signals from the discriminators, which
correspond to gω in MA-AIRL and log(Dω) in MA-GAIL.
Tables 3 and 4 provide the SCC and PCC statistics for co-
operative and competitive environments respectively. In
the cooperative case, compared to MA-GAIL, MA-AIRL
achieves a much higher PCC and SCC, which could facil-
itate policy learning. The statistical correlations between
reward signals gathered from discriminators for each agent
are also quite high, suggesting that while we do not reveal
the agents are cooperative, MA-AIRL is able to discover
high correlations between the agents’ reward functions. In
the competitive case, the reward functions learned by MA-
AIRL also significantly outperform MA-GAIL in terms
of SCC and PCC statistics. In Figure 1, we further show
the changes of PCC statistics with respect to training time
steps for MA-GAIL and MA-AIRL. The reward functions
recovered by MA-GAIL initially have a high correlation
with the ground truth, yet that dramatically decreases as
training continues, whereas the functions learned by MA-
AIRL maintains a high correlation throughout the course of
Table 3. Statistical correlations between the learned reward func-
tions and the ground-truth rewards in cooperative tasks. Mean
and variance are taken across N independently learned reward
functions for N agents.
Task Metric MA-GAIL MA-AIRL
Nav. SCC 0.792 ± 0.085 0.934 ± 0.015PCC 0.556 ± 0.081 0.882 ± 0.028
Comm. SCC 0.879 ± 0.059 0.936 ± 0.080PCC 0.612 ± 0.093 0.848 ± 0.099
Table 4. Statistical correlations between the learned reward func-
tions and the ground-truth rewards in competitive task.
Algorithm MA-GAIL MA-AIRL
SCC #1 0.424 0.534
SCC #2 0.653 0.907
Average SCC 0.538 0.721
PCC #1 0.497 0.720
PCC #2 0.392 0.667
Average PCC 0.445 0.694
training, which is in line with the theoretical analysis that
in MA-GAIL, reward signals from the discriminators will
become less informative towards convergence.
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Figure 1. PCC w.r.t. the training epochs in cooperative navigation,
with MA-AIRL (blue) and MA-GAIL (orange).
6. Discussion and Future Work
We propose MA-AIRL, the first multi-agent MaxEnt IRL
framework that is effective and scalable to Markov games
with high-dimensional state-action space and unknown dy-
namics. We derive our algorithm based on a solution con-
cept termed LSBRE and we employ maximum pseudolikeli-
hood estimation to achieve tractability. Experimental results
demonstrate that MA-AIRL is able to imitate expert behav-
iors in high-dimensional complex environments, as well as
learn reward functions that are highly correlated with the
ground truth rewards. An exciting avenue for future work is
to include reward regularization to mitigate overfitting and
leverage prior knowledge of the task structure.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Trajectory Distribution Induced by Logistic Stochastic Best Response Equilibrium
Let {pit−i(at−i|st)}Tt=1 denote other agents’ marginal LSBRE policies, and {pˆiti(ati|at−i, st)}Tt=1 denote agent i’s conditional
policy. With chain rule, the induced trajectory distribution is given by:
pˆ(τ) =
[
η(s1) ·
T∏
t=1
P (st+1|st,at) · pit−i(at−i|st))
]
·
T∏
t=1
pˆiti(a
t
i|at−i, st) (14)
Suppose the desired distribution is given by:
p(τ) ∝
[
η(s1) ·
T∏
t=1
P (st+1|st,at) · pit−i(at−i|st))
]
· exp
(
T∑
t=1
ri(s
t, ati,a
t
−i)
)
(15)
Now we will shown that the optimal solution to the following optimization problem correspond to the LSBRE conditional
policies:
min
pˆi1:Ti
DKL(pˆ(τ)||p(τ)) (16)
The optimization problem in Equation (16) is equivalent to (the partition function of the desired distribution is a constant
with respect to optimized policies):
max
pˆi1:Ti
Eτ∼pˆ(τ)
[
log η(s1) +
T∑
t=1
(logP (st+1|st,at) + logpit−i(at−i|st) + ri(st,at))−
log η(s1)−
T∑
t=1
(logP (st+1|st,at) + logpit−i(at−i|st) + log pˆiti(ati|at−i, st))
]
= Eτ∼pˆ(τ)
[
T∑
t=1
ri(s
t,at)− log pˆiti(ati|at−i, st)
]
=
T∑
t=1
E(st,at)∼pˆ(st,at)[ri(st,at)− log pˆiti(ati|at−i, st)] (17)
To maximize this objective, we can use a dynamic programming procedure. Let us first consider the base case of optimizing
pˆiTi (a
T
i |aT−i, sT ):
E(sT ,aT )∼pˆ(sT ,aT )[ri(sT ,aT )− log pˆiTi (aTi |aT−i)] =
EsT∼pˆ(sT ),aT−i∼piT−i(·|sT )
[
−DKL
(
pˆiTi (a
T
i |aT−i, sT )||
exp(ri(s
T , aTi ,a
T
−i))
exp(Vi(sT ,aT−i))
)
+ Vi(s
T ,aT−i)
]
(18)
where exp(Vi(sT ,aT−i)) is the partition function and Vi(s
T ,aT−i) = log
∑
a′i
exp(ri(s
T , a′i,a
T
−i)). The optimal policy is
given by:
piTi (a
T
i |aT−i, sT ) = exp(ri(sT , aTi ,aT−i)− Vi(sT ,aT−i)) (19)
With the optimal policy in Equation (19), Equation (18) is equivalent to (with the KL divergence being zero):
E(sT ,aT )∼pˆ(sT ,aT )[ri(sT ,aT )− log pˆiTi (aTi |aT−i)] = EsT∼pˆ(sT ),aT−i∼piT−i(·|sT )[Vi(s
T ,aT−i)] (20)
Then recursively, for a given time step t, pˆiti(a
t
i|at−i, st) must maximize:
E(st,at)∼pˆ(st,at)
[
ri(s
t,at)− log pˆiti(ati|at−i) + Est+1∼P (·|st,at),at+1−i ∼pit+1−i (·|st+1)[V
pit+2:T
i (s
t+1,at+1−i )]
]
= (21)
Est∼pˆ(st),at−i∼pit−i(·|st)
[
−DKL
(
pˆiti(a
t
i|at−i, st)||
exp(Qpi
t+1:T
i (s
t, ati,a
t
−i))
exp(V pi
t+1:T
i (s
t,at−i))
)
+ V pi
t+1:T
i (s
t,at−i)
]
(22)
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where we define:
Qpi
t+1:T
i (s
t,at) = ri(s
t,at) + Est+1∼p(·|st,at)
[
H(pit+1i (·|st+1)) + Eat+1−i ∼pit+1−i (·|st+1)[Vi(s
t+1,at+1−i )]
]
(23)
V pi
t+1:T
i (s
t,at−i) = log
∑
a′i
exp(Qpi
t+1:T
i (s
t, a′i,a
t
−i)) (24)
The optimal policy to Equation (22) is given by:
piti(a
t
i|at−i, st) = exp(Qpi
t+1:T
i (s
t,at)− V pit+1:Ti (st,at−i)) (25)
which is exactly the set of conditional distributions used to produce LSBRE (Definition 2).
A.2. Maximum Pseudolikelihood Estimation for LSBRE
Theorem 2 strictly follows the asymptotic consistency property of maximum pseudolikelihood estimation (Lehmann &
Casella, 2006; Dawid & Musio, 2014). For simplicity, we will show the proof for normal form games and similar to
Appendix A.1, the extension to Markov games can be proved by induction.
Consider a normal form game with N players and reward functions {ri(a;ωi)}Ni=1. Suppose the expert demonstrations D =
{(a1, . . . , aN )m}Mm=1 are generated by pi(a;ω∗), where ω∗ denotes the true value of the parameters. The pseudolikelihood
objective we want to maximize is given by:
`PL(ω) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
log pii(a
m
i |am−i;ωi) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
log
exp(ri(a
m
i ,a
m
−i;ωi))∑
a′i
exp(ri(a′i,a
m
−i;ωi))
(26)
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
ri(a
m
i ,a
m
−i;ωi)−
1
M
M∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
logZ(am−i;ωi) (27)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
a
pD(a)ri(ai,a−i;ωi)−
N∑
i=1
∑
a−i
pD(a−i) logZ(a−i;ωi) (28)
where pD is the empirical data distribution and Z(a−i;ωi) is the partition function.
Take derivatives of `PL(ω):
∂
∂ω
`PL(ω) =
N∑
i=1
∑
a
pD(a)
∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi)−
N∑
i=1
∑
a−i
pD(a−i)
1
Z(a−i;ωi)
∂
∂ω
Z(a−i;ωi) (29)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
a
pD(a)
∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi)−
N∑
i=1
∑
a−i
pD(a−i)
∑
ai
exp(ri(ai,a−i;ωi))
Z(a−i;ωi)
∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi) (30)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
a
pD(a)
∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi)−
N∑
i=1
∑
a−i
pD(a−i)
∑
ai
pii(ai|a−i;ωi) ∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi) (31)
When the sample size m→∞, Equation (31) is equivalent to:
∂
∂ω
`PL(ω) =
N∑
i=1
∑
a
p(a;ω∗)
∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi)−
N∑
i=1
∑
a−i
p(a−i;ω∗)
∑
ai
pii(ai|a−i;ωi) ∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi) (32)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
a−i
p(a−i;ω∗)
∑
ai
(p(ai|a−i;ω∗)− pii(ai|a−i;ωi)) ∂
∂ω
ri(ai,a−i;ωi) (33)
When ω = ω∗, the gradients in Equation (33) will be zero.
